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Middle East leaders should ask themselves if they will be remembered "for resisting reform or for 
leading it."  
– President Bush[1]  
  
Sadly, one would be hard-pressed to name a single Arab country in which grand corruption 
among high officials of the state was not endemic.  
– Paul Salem[2]  
   
Introduction  
Headlines reading “Corruption Means the Poor Stay Poor in Oil-Rich State”[3] or “Millionaire 
Mullahs”[ 4] have become all too common. In fact, one is often hard pressed to pick up a reputable 
newspaper without some sort of corruption story on the politics, business, or even the sports 
pages. In countries developed and developing, large or small, market-oriented or otherwise, 
prominent politicians have lost their official positions and, in some cases, whole governments 
have been replaced as a result of corruption scandals.[5]  
Historically, the United States government was concerned with corruption in foreign countries 
largely because many American exporters allegedly lost out on foreign deals because they are 
not allowed, under U.S. law, to pay bribes to foreign officials. For American companies, the 
payment of bribes to foreign officials is a criminal act and, of course, the bribes paid cannot be 
deducted as costs for tax purposes. Often this is not the case for their competitors from many of 
the other advanced industrialized countries.  
More recently however, U.S. concern over corruption has taken on a greater urgency. Corrupt 
countries often tend to be failed states, thus presenting the U.S. with a series of potential and real 
problems. Each poses a threat to the U.S. not from adversarial power and weaponry, but from 
weakness and inability to control what happens on its territory. When poor states such as 
Afghanistan, Somalia, Liberia, and Sudan lose control, it’s often Americans who pay the price.[6] 
Iraq was a failed state of a different sort, but still riddled with corruption. In fact a broad band of 
weak and failed states—in the greater Middle East, as well as from South and Central Asia to 
African and the Caribbean—can harbor terrorists and drug traffickers, and spark humanitarian 
disasters. Ironically, these weak and ineffectual states have the ability to undermine global 
economic growth and prosperity.[7]  
These realities hit home with the September 11th attacks. At that time it became all to apparent to 
U.S. policymakers that economic stagnation, widespread unemployment, and the lack of 
democracy and freedom—all caused direct, or indirectly by corruption—were driving many young 
people in the Middle East and North Africa towards extremism and terrorism. The World Bank 
concurs, identifying corruption as the single biggest obstacle to economic development, 
estimating that corruption-related activities reduce world income by five percent, or more than 
$1.5 trillion a year.[8]  
In many Middle East countries, corruption has become endemic.[9] The existence of pro-
American, yet autocratic regimes in the region is no longer a guarantee for lasting stability or 
even prosperity. Many of the region’s oil states, for example, have found that resources alone do 
not produce stability or prosperity. In these economies corruption, and the potential for instability 
it creates, often occurs as a result of weak institutions, the absence of government procurement 
and auditing systems, and a lack of revenue transparency.[10]  
In a speech on November 7, 2003, President Bush summed up his Administration’s assessment 
of the region: “As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish it will 
remain a place of stagnation, resentment and violence easy for export. And with the spread of 
weapons that can bring catastrophic harm to our country and to our fiends, it would be reckless to 
accept the status quo.”[11]  
In this regard, the adoption of the United States’ sponsored Broader Middle East and North 
African Initiative (a later version of the Greater Middle East and North African Initiative) by the 
Group of Eight Industrialized Nations (G-8) at their June 8-10 summit in Sea Island, Georgia is 
seen by the Bush Administration as representing a milestone in the war on terrorism. The 
initiative has two key elements. The first is the launching of a “Partnership for Progress and a 
Common Future with The Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa.” The second is a 
plan for the G-8 countries to support reform in Arab countries.  
While the G-8 declaration commits to “work with governments and business leaders to promote 
entrepreneurship, expand trade and investment, increase access to capital, support financial 
reforms, secure property rights, promote transparency and fight corruption,”[12] the details of the 
initiative are unclear at this time perhaps because of the sensitivity of the issue.  
To help appreciate the importance of the corruption issue, together with providing some sense of 
the factors that contribute to it in the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries, the 
following sections examine corruption in the region from an empirical perspective. What are the 
main patterns of corruption in the region? The effect of corruption on the economies? The impact 
that effective reforms and anti-corruption programs are likely to have on corruption? Based on 
this analysis a final section draws some tentative conclusions for possible U.S. anti-corruption 
initiatives in the region.  
 
 Corruption: Conceptual Issues  
While varied definitions exist, the most popular and simplest definition of public corruption is the 
one used by the World Bank: the abuse of public power for private benefit.[13] This is Within this 
framework, acts of corruption cover a spectrum of activities ranging from: 
· Bureaucratic (or “petty”) or political (or “grand”)—for example, corruption by the 
bureaucracy or by the political leadership;  
· Cost-reducing (to the briber) or benefit enhancing;  
· Briber-initiated or bribee-initiated;  
· Coercive or collusive; centralized or decentralized; and  
· Predictable or arbitrary; and involving cash payments or not[14]  
Defining corruption is one thing, measuring it is quite a different matter. Even assuming the 
existence of accurate data, simply measuring bribes paid would ignore many corrupt practices of 
a more qualitative nature—tit for tat type acts for example. In actual practice, researchers of 
corruption issues usually rely on indirect measures of its prevalence in a country or institution.  
In this regard, questionnaire-based surveys of corruption perception (not actual measures of 
corruption) are probably the most realistic measures available. The best known of these surveys, 
the Transparency International Index, assesses the perception of corruption on a scale of 0 to 10, 
where “0” is a country where most transactions or relations are tainted by corruption and “10” is a 
corruption-free country. The variance of these indexes, which reflects how the views vary 
between respondents, is also important in assessing the figures on any individual country. The 
latest Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for 2003 (Table 1) shows 
that of the MENA countries, Oman and Bahrain score the highest and are ranked 26th and 27th 
respectively. Another cluster of Gulf States, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE come in at 32nd, 35th 
and 37th respectively. Many, beginning with Syria at 66th, fall toward the bottom of the rankings. 
The World Bank Control of Corruption Index is also a perception-driven measure. It is derived 
from a series of sources[15] and is part of a larger data set covering five main areas of 
governance: 
1. control of corruption;  
2. voice and accountability;  
3. political stability;  
4. regulatory quality;  
5. rule of law  
6. government effectiveness[16].  
The index has a mean of zero, with higher values indicating a greater control of cooption.  
Patterns of Corruption in the MENA Region  
Using this measure, the MENA countries conveniently fall into several distinctive groups (Table 2), 
with most countries moderately above or below the norm for the world as a whole. Compared with 
other parts of the world, progress at governance reform in the MENA region has lagged 
somewhat. The MENA countries are:  
 
· somewhat below the norm (-0.151) for control of corruption;  
· considerably below other countries in voice and accountability (-0.906);  
· lagging in political stability (-0.334), regulatory quality (-0.334), and government 
effectiveness (-0.196); and  
· near the norm with regard to the rule of law.  
Most MENA countries are fairly consistent in their reform efforts, either making fairly decent 
progress across the six main governance measures, or lagging behind across the board. The 
main exception is voice and accountability, where progress is consistently behind that made in 
other areas of governance.  
With the exception of rule of law, most MENA countries have made improvements in their 
governance in recent years (Table 3). Progress has not been even, however, and a gap may be 
widening between those countries above the corruption norm in most measures making relatively 
more progress than those below the norm.  
Transparency International contends that corruption in MENA countries stems from several key 
factors. Ultimately these no doubt derive from fact that the region is deficient in two areas 
necessary for control of corruption—regulatory quality and voice and accountability. With regard 
to regulatory quality, there has been a tendency for institutional reforms accompanying economic 
liberalization programs to lag. Underdevelopment of regulatory powers has created new 
opportunities for rent seeking. For example, when granting private licenses for providers of mobile 
phone networks authorities in several countries failed to put in place impartial and effective 
regulators. According to Transparency International the result was wide levels of discretionary 
powers enjoyed by private providers and state officials—an environment conducive to 
corruption.[17]  
Second, the prevalence of authoritarian rule (lack of voice and accountability) in the region is a 
hindrance to transparency and accountability in both the state and private sectors. Lack of 
accountability often means state budgets are insufficiently itemized to permit close scrutiny, while 
important state revenues are managed in extra-budgetary funds or parallel institutions that allow 
for discretionary spending. For example Libya’s oil revenues, constituting 95 percent of the 
nation’s exports, are held in secret funds and controlled exclusively by Colonel Muammar al-
Qaddafi and his associates. Furthermore, most MENA governments compensate for low popular 
support or poor legitimacy by granting opportunities for bribery to leading families or cliques.[18]  
Clearly the installation of democratic institutions would help in promoting accountability but given 
the long history of corruption in the region it would probably not be sufficient to eradicate it, at 
least in the short term. At a minimum, to accomplish this, better regulatory structures would have 
to be put in place and further strengthening of the rule of law would be required in most countries. 
Even with reforms in these areas, old habits are likely to die hard. No doubt it will take some time 
before the cycle of corruption is broken in many of the MENA countries.  
Corruption Linkages  
A crude plot of per capita income and Transparency International’s CPI suggests that with growth 
rising incomes and awareness, the public at large may place pressure on governments to 
undertake the necessary reforms. In short, countries may outgrow their tolerance of corruption. 
After years of study, economists have concluded that a country’s ability to accumulate physical 
and human capital, and the efficiency with which it turns its capital and natural resources into 
goods and services, are key factors in explaining differences in national incomes. Another truism 
is that to attain high rates of capital formation, investors require legal protection. In this regard, 
countries adhering to common law generally have the strongest legal protection for investors, 
followed by counties adhering to civil law adopted from the German and Scandinavian legal 
traditions; many MENA countries rooted in French civil law offer the weakest legal protection.[19] 
Legal systems that provide strong legal protection for investors have permitted the development 
of sophisticated financial markets, which enhances the economy’s ability to bear risk. This ability 
to spread risk over a multitude of investors is critical for entrepreneurship and economic growth. 
But differences in the legal system are only part of the story. Actual enforcement of the law is as 
or even more important. In this regard, corruption renders codified law ineffective. By weakening 
property rights, corruption deprives investors of compensation for risk taking and increases 
uncertainty about potential investment payoffs. This decreases the incentive to invest, which in 
turn dampens economic growth.[20]  
Another detrimental aspect of corruption is its tendency to distort markets. In turn, market 
distortions result in an inefficient allocation of resources, further reducing wealth creation and 
growth. Specifically corruption:  
· Undermines the Market System: Corruption often reduces the ability of the government to 
impose necessary regulatory controls and inspections to correct for market failures –a 
situation where social costs and benefits differ from privates ones.[21] The result is often 
rates of investment and output. Similarly when corrupt governments create monopolies 
for private interests to exploit, investment and output most always decline.  
· Distorts incentives: In a corrupt environment able individuals instead of focusing on 
production or innovative activity often find it more profitable to apply their energies to rent 
seeking – the pursuit of artificially high profits created through the granting of special 
licenses, quotas and other restrictions on market supply. In these cases there is usually 
more money to be made in collecting rents than in actually producing the goods 
themselves.  
· Creates inefficient industries: In some instances governmental protection from foreign 
competition has actually encouraged the growth of local firms with negative value added, 
thus reducing national output.[22]  
· Acts as an arbitrary and uncertain tax: Corruption’s capricious nature creates high excess 
burdens because the cost of searching for those to whom the bribe must be paid must be 
added to the cost of negotiating and paying the bribe.  
· Weakens financial system: Because the size of the bribe is often unclear, excessive cash 
balances must be kept, thus reducing the funds available from the financial system for 
productive investment—in a corrupt economy a preponderance of transactions are in 
cash.[23]  
Finally corruption is likely to increase poverty because it reduces the income earning potential of 
the poor. This effect stems from the fact that enterprises can protect themselves more easily from 
corrupt officials because:  
· They have specialized departments that can deal with aggressive bureaucrats;  
· They can use “facilitators” individuals skilled at fighting through the jungle of opaque 
regulations and tax laws; and  
· Their size makes them more immune to the extortion of petty bureaucrats;  
In turn the poverty created and maintained by corruption inhibits growth through the 
underdevelopment of large domestic markets.[24]  
 
 
The Empirical Dimension  
These general propositions concerning the adverse impact of corruption on incomes and growth 
have been confirmed in numerous empirical studies[25]where it was found that corruption: 
· Reduces investment and as a consequence reduces the rate of growth. Such reduction in 
investment is assumed to be caused by the higher costs and the uncertainty that 
corruption creates.[26]  
· Reduces expenditure on education and health, because these allocations do not easily 
lend themselves to corrupt practices on the part of those who make budgetary decisions. 
Since human capital has been found to be one of the main sources of long-term 
economic growth, a major cost of corruption is this foregone income.  
· Increases public investment because public investment projects lend themselves to “kick-
backs.” (A related “White Elephant” effect is notorious for diverting capital from more 
productive private sector actives.)  
· Increases the acquisition of weapons systems where large “commissions” often accrue to 
the cronies of local officials. Empirical evidence suggests that often the link between 
military expenditure and income growth is negative.[27]  
· Reduces expenditure for operation and maintenance since the normal budgetary process 
makes corruption more difficult than in the case of normal procurement. The effect is to 
lower the productivity of public capital, slowing private investment thus producing a drag 
on economic growth.  
· Reduces tax revenue directly where bribes are paid for tax avoidance. If governments run 
deficits to offset the loss of revenue, the ensuing inflation may distort and retard the 
pattern of investment.  
· Reduces foreign direct investment because corruption has the same effect as a tax. The 
less predictable the level of corruption (the higher is its variance) the greater its impact on 
foreign direct investment.  
Corruption and Per Capita Income in the MENA Region  
The previous sections suggest that improving the control of corruption is likely to be a productive 
way to initiate sustained growth in the MENA region. Logically these benefits would be even 
greater for those countries below the norm on the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index. 
However improvement in other areas of governance such as voice and accountability may, from 
an empirical perspective have even a greater positive impact on the economy. The same could 
be said for improvements in the rule of law, or for that manner any of the other main areas of 
governance.  
Generalizations of this type for the region are a bit difficult because the governance and 
economic structures of MENA countries vary considerably depending on whether or not they are 
oil exporters. These considerations are especially important in the context of corruption—the 
nature or types of corruption found in the oil countries (rentier economies) varies considerably 
from that commonly found in the non-oil economies.[28]  
In the case of the oil-exporters, especially the oil monarchies and emirates of the Gulf, the ruling 
families have in large part appropriated the profits from the oil sector through blurring the 
distinction between public and private treasure and extending their familial involvement beyond oil 
to include local industry, services and trade, through public and private contracting.[29] Because 
a great deal of this is internal, with foreign investment often frozen out of a wide spectrum of 
industries, much of this type of corruption may slip by the standard corruption perception surveys.  
On the other hand, many of the non-oil MENA countries have the remnants of former state-run 
socialist economies. Despite some economic liberalization and privatization in the past couple of 
decades, high government officials still have preponderant control over the economic resources 
of the country. They not only control the massive public sector but they also dominate the private 
sector in that much of the private sector is dependent on contracts or cooperation from the public 
sector to undertake its business. In this regard, Salam has observed that “Government elites that 
trace their routes to austere military backgrounds or political parties, have mellowed into 
traditional power holders who place their children and relatives in positions of power and profit 
and seek to translate their political authority into financial and economic power as well.”[30]  
Differences Between Rentier and Non-Rentier MENA Economies  
Some of these differences in environment between the rentier and non-rentier MENA countries 
are reflected in their varied progress at governance and economic reforms (Table 4). With the 
exception of the rule of law, the MENA countries as a whole score considerably below non-MENA 
states in all of the standard measures of governance. The gap is largest for voice and 
accountability. Within the MENA countries the rentier states score below the non-rentier countries 
in voice and accountability, and regulatory quality. On the other hand the rentier economies have 
considerably more political stability and less corruption, at least as revealed by the perception 
surveys. Rule of law is firmer in the rentier economies as is government effectiveness.  
In the economic area (high values reflect lower attainment) the MENA countries lag the non-
MENA states in trade policy (considerably), fiscal burden, government intervention (greatly), 
foreign investment (considerably), banking and finance (greatly) wages and prices, and property 
rights. The MENA states have had more progress in monetary policy, and regulation. Both groups 
are about even in controlling the informal market. Given the generally low regulatory quality in the 
MENA countries, the protection from foreign trade, limited government effectiveness and large 
scale government intervention, they no doubt provide a fertile environment for corruption to 
flourish. This is only reinforced by the huge MENA deficit in voice and accountability.  
Within the MENA region, the rentier countries have had more economic liberalization in the trade 
area, but their governments tend to intervene considerably more than in the case of the non-
rentier states. The non-rentier countries have created a much more favorable environment for 
foreign investment and liberalized their markets to a greater extent than the rentier states.  
Empirical Links Between Corruption and Per Capita Income  
As noted above, these differences in governance and economic freedom between MENA and 
non-MENA countries as well as those between the MENA rentier and non-rentier economies will 
likely affect the manner in which a certain level of corruption impacts on an individual country’s 
economy. For the broad groupings of countries, a statistical analysis (Table 5) suggests that the 
plot diagram in Figure 1 is somewhat misleading. While the correlation between the two variables 
in the diagram is around 0.87 and highly significant statistically, other variables play an important 
role in effecting incomes. In addition, other groupings of countries paint quite a different picture.  
 
Figure 1: Corruption Perception Index and Per Capita Income 
Specifically, while control of corruption is a major determinant of per capita income for a large 
sample of developing countries (125), it is not as important a factor as the improvement of overall 
governance (an average of the six governance measures under examination) or whether a 
country was a renter economy. Everything else equal, rentier economies have a higher per capita 
income than non-rentier economies. Finally, the share of capital formation in GDP also positively 
affects per capita income.  
However, control of corruption may not be a panacea for improved income levels in all countries. 
As figure 1 suggests, and an analysis of countries with per capita incomes under $1,000 
confirmed, anti-corruption drives in very poor countries did not significantly improve per capita 
incomes. For these countries, increased levels of capital formation as a share of GDP was the 
only statistically significant variable affecting per capita income. While beyond the scope of this 
study, there are several possible explanations for this finding:  
1. Very low income countries may simply lack the resources to take advantage of 
opportunities opened up by anti-corruption drives, or  
2. Certain types of corruption in very low income countries may provide some beneficial 
economic effects—compensation to low salaried government officials to speed up paper 
work etc.  
For countries with per capita incomes greater than $1,000, control of corruption was the major 
determinant of per capita incomes. Again, given a rate of control of corruption, whether or not a 
country was a rentier economy affected per capita income with the rentiers attaining higher 
income levels.  
It’s interesting to note that control of corruption was the most significant variable affecting per 
capita income in both the MENA[31] and non-MENA groups of countries. The major difference 
between the two groups was the presence of the rentier effect in the MENA sample, but not in the 
Non-MENA group of countries. For the non-MENA countries, improvements in the rule of law 
impacted positively on per capita incomes. This was not the case for the MENA states.  
In short these findings support the argument that control of corruption is a major factor in affecting 
per capita incomes. The predominant effect is most likely from corruption to per capita income, 
although over time improvements in per capita income no doubt affect the ability and willingness 
of nations to fight corruption. While there may be real world exceptions, these results appear to 
apply to countries with per capita incomes already over $1,000. Unfortunately, these countries 
are often those who are the most deficient in all areas of governance. Perhaps one reason for the 
lack of reforms in these countries is the absence of immediate income gains to show for the 
sacrifices accrued.  
As suggested above (Table 4), many countries that have achieved excellent progress in 
improving their governance have also made commensurate gains in reforming many key areas of 
economic policy. It’s possible therefore that per capita income is really more related to economic 
reform rather than governance improvements. In this case the apparent association between say 
improvements in the control of corruption with higher per capita income would be spurious. 
Additional tests were undertaken to check for this possibility.  
The results (Table 6) basically confirm the importance of the control of corruption as a major 
factor affecting per capita incomes —this variable is still statically significant in affecting per capita 
incomes in both the MENA and non-MENA groups of countries after explicitly taking into account 
economic reforms. Of the economic variables, improvements in the fiscal burden is likely to have 
a positive impact on MENA per capita incomes, while improved trade policy is associated with 
higher per capita incomes in the non-MENA countries.  
Improvements in the Control of Corruption on Other Areas of Reform  
As suggested above, it is unlikely that the various aspects of governance and economic freedom 
are completely independent of each other – progress in one area is likely to affect the willingness 
of policy makers in pressing ahead with similar reforms in other areas. Given that progress in all 
reforms is a desirable outcome, it’s of some interest to identify the extent to which anti-corruption 
drives have this carry over effect. As a basis of comparison, the analyses also included the 
overall-index of economic freedom along with the corruption index.  
The results (Table 7) suggest that somewhat different effects accruing from anti-corruption drives 
in the MENA and non-MENA countries. Most importantly, there appear to be many more reform 
linkages in the non-MENA group. While in both groups of countries, improvements in anti-
corruption carry over to improvements in all of the other areas of governance, the non-MENA 
countries also experience many similar positive effects from improvements in economic freedom. 
Improved economic freedom leads to improved regulatory quality in both sets of countries, but in 
the case of the non-MENA group, positive changes in voice and accountability, government 
effectiveness and overall-governance also accrue from improvements in economic freedom.  
A similar pattern characterizes the various areas of economic freedom. While both groups of 
countries experience a number of positive stimuli on individual reform areas stemming from an 
improvement in their over-all index of economic freedom, the non-MENA countries also 
experience a similar effect from improvements in their control of corruption. For them, 
improvements in the corruption area carry over to trade policy, government intervention, 
monetary policy, property rights, regulation and the informal markets. Trade policy appears to be 
the only area positively affected by improvements in corruption occurring in the MENA countries.  
Factors Affecting Corruption  
Finally, anti corruption drives are likely to be affected by developments (positive or negative) in 
the various areas of governance and or economic freedom. For the non-MENA countries (Table 
8), improved government effectiveness appears to carry over to positive action in the control of 
corruption. For these countries, improved voice and democracy also appear important in this 
regard. In contrast, improvements in over-all economic freedom and political stability appear to be 
the critical areas of improvement leading to improvements in the control of corruption. In other 
words the non-MENA countries appear to undertake anti-corruption under a more democratic 
political process together with pressure from a more efficient governmental structure for 
eliminating corruption. In the MENA countries, political stability appears to be critical for anti-
corruption efforts. In this context anti-corruption is possibly seen as a necessary complement to 
maintain gains in economic freedom.  
This model predicts well over ninety percent of the differences in corruption throughout the MENA 
region (bottom, Table 8). As one might anticipate, there is a slight tendency for it to under-predict 
the corruption in the higher corruption countries and to over-predict it in the case of the lower 
corruption countries.  
Assessment  
On both conceptual and empirical grounds, a strong case can be made for giving corruption a 
high priority in the MENA region. Improved control of corruption appears critical for moving up the 
per capita income ladder. Given the political dynamics in the region, efforts in the realm of 
corruption appear to pay high dividends in inducing follow on improvements in other areas of 
governance, especially voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, and 
to a lesser extent regulatory quality. Unfortunately, an improved corruption environment does not 
appear to significantly stimulate follow-on reforms in the economic realm.  
While the United States and the Western countries should support reform efforts in the region, it’s 
unclear the extent to which efforts in this area might turn counter-productive. In this regard, a 
group of first class Arab minds, the Project for Democracy Studies in Arab Counties, has stressed 
the importance of indigenous initiated reforms:[32]  
The sense of managing alone contrasts sharply with the attitude of most Arab commentators, 
who delight in blaming the rest of the world for every misfortune, real or imagined, and look to 
right all wrongs. The Oxford delegates believe that it is only Arabs themselves who can create the 
institutions in their societies that can lead them to a better future.  
To a certain extent, the basis for an indigenous reform process may already exist in many of the 
key MENA countries. As noted above, in the MENA region control of corruption MENA appears to 
improve with increases in the over-all economic freedom score as well as improvements in 
political stability. The economic freedom index is a composite of the various categories noted in 
Table 4: foreign investment, trade policy, banking and finance and the like.  
Because improvements in the corruption situation in the MENA countries do not appear to 
stimulate follow on economic reforms there may be a very positive role for countries outside the 
region to play. Here the United States, through international organizations such as the IMF, and 
the WTO can play an active role in supporting reforms—trade liberalization to comply with WTO 
agreements for example. To the extent that a direct U.S. approach of trying to speed up the 
democratization process might cause increased political instability in the region, the most 
effective path for the U.S may well be an indirect multilateral one.  
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each 
month, email ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe". There is no charge, and your 
address will be used for no other purpose. 
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